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Abstract
Two experiments with undergraduates as subjects tested explanations of how a prior
temporary income change influences choices between buying and deferred buying. In Exper-
iment 1 predictions from the behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988), the re-
newable resources model (Linville & Fischer, 1991) and the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling
& Romanus, 1997) were contrasted. The results are inconsistent with the latter two expla-
nations since the framing of buying as positive (buying a new model of a product) or negative
(replacing a broken product) did not interact with the income change. Congruent with the
behavioral life-cycle theory, willingness to buy was greater when subjects received a temporary
income increase than when they received a temporary income decrease although total assets
were equal. Further support for the behavioral life-cycle theory is obtained in Experiment 2
where four income-change conditions and durable and nondurable goods are com-
pared. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
According to the life-cycle theory (Modigliani, 1988) people strive toward a
uniform consumption during the life cycle implying that they take loans when
their income is low and is expected to be higher in the future and that they save
when their income is higher than expected. Empirical observations have
however indicated that current income may be a more important factor than
the theory predicts. For instance, it is known that middle-aged households
have a higher degree of consumption than younger and older households
(Courant, Gramlich & Laitner, 1986). In Shefrin and Thaler’s (1988, 1992)
behavioral life-cycle theory, it is proposed that people decompose wealth into
three dierent mental accounts, current income, current assets and future in-
come and that the propensity to consume diers for these mental accounts. By
violating the assumption that money is exchangeable or fungible (Thaler,
1990), other predictions than those of the life-cycle theory are made concerning
the role of current income for consumption and savings across the life span.
In a survey of students’ expectations of future consumption, Shefrin and
Thaler (1988) obtained direct support for the predictions from the behavioral
life-cycle theory in that subjects expected to consume more of a windfall gain
during a year if money was coded as current income than if it was coded as
current assets and that they expected to consume least if it was coded as future
income. However, in a similar study by Selart, Karlsson and Garling (1997) of
a Swedish nationwide sample and a student sample, the results diered from
those obtained by Shefrin and Thaler (1988). It was found that subjects ex-
pected to consume more from current assets than from current income. Since
a windfall received immediately as a lump sum was assumed to be coded as
current assets and a windfall received as increments per month during the year
was assumed to be coded as current income there was a dierence when the
windfall was received in time. The results obtained were therefore better ac-
counted for by the temporal discounting of future consumption suggested in
research on intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).
The concept of mental account was introduced by Thaler (1980, 1985),
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984), see also
Henderson and Peterson (1992). It refers to the coding and categorizing of
which outcomes are going to be evaluated jointly or separately. This coding
of outcomes into mental accounts is specific to the decision to be made. It can
be distinguished from the mental accounts referred to in the behavioral life-
cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992) which instead are a priori held
mental accounts forming part of people’s financial knowledge. Similarly,
450 N. Karlsson et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 20 (1999) 449–463
Ranyard (1995) makes a conceptual distinction between the formation of
specific mental accounts and on-going mental accounts. He argued that the
latter are higher order and more stable cognitive structures. Although having
attracted research interest (Heath, 1995; Hirst, Joyce & Schadewald, 1994;
Selart et al., 1997; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992; Thaler, 1990; Winett &
Lewis, 1995), the impact of on-going mental accounts on specific decisions
has not been investigated.
In the present study, the question was raised whether the behavioral life-
cycle theory is capable of accounting for how temporary income changes
influence specific buying decisions. Since buying decisions frequently entail
intertemporal choices (e.g., between buying or defer buying), it is possible that
some alternative explanations are more viable also in this case. More specif-
ically, the aim is to investigate how accurately the behavioral life-cycle theory,
the renewable resources model (Linville & Fischer, 1991) or the loss-sensitivity
principle (Garling & Romanus, 1997) explain why people choose to buy im-
mediately or to defer buying after experiencing a temporary income change.
Linville and Fischer’s (1991) renewable resources model deals with people’s
preferences for temporarily segregating or integrating emotionally significant
(social, academic and economic) events, for example, whether people want
two positive events to occur on the same or dierent days. Briefly, the model
assumes that people have limited but renewable resources to cope with both
positive and negative events. An income increase may be assumed to be per-
ceived as a positive event and an income decrease as a negative event. Fur-
thermore, buying may psychologically either constitute a positive or a
negative event. For instance, buying a new attractive model of a consumer
product may be perceived to be positive whereas replacing a broken product
may be perceived to be negative or at least less positive than buying a new
model. If a decision to buy is made following an income increase the renewable
resources model predicts that buying is deferred due to a preference for seg-
regating two positive events. On the other hand, since there is a preference to
integrate a positive and a negative event, buying is predicted not to be deferred
following an income decrease. If buying is negative, the reverse predictions are
made: people are assumed to buy following an income increase, whereas they
are assumed to defer buying following an income decrease.
A recent explanation of integration and segregation of a prior outcome
(for a recent review, see Garling, Karlsson, Romanus & Selart, 1997) is the
loss-sensitivity principle proposed by Garling and Romanus (1997). Ac-
cording to this principle, a prior outcome is only integrated with expected
losses. The loss-sensitivity principle has received support in a series of
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experiments in which subjects indicated their satisfaction with outcomes of
gambling choices (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Garling, Romanus & Selart,
1994; Romanus, Hassing & Garling, 1996; Romanus, Karlsson & Garling,
1997). If an income change is considered to be a prior outcome, the loss-
sensitivity principle states that it will only be integrated with and thus aect a
decision to buy when this decision is perceived to be negative (i.e., a loss).
Thus, when buying is perceived to be negative it is predicted that people are
more willing to buy after an income increase and more willing to defer buying
after an income decrease. In contrast, no eect is predicted of an income
change when buying is perceived to be positive.
2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, subjects were oered hypothetical choices between buy-
ing a durable good immediately or defer buying following a temporary in-
come increase or decrease. Income increase and decrease conditions were
equivalent with respect to total assets, balanced by the amount of savings in
the income-decrease condition. According to the behavioral life-cycle theory
(Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992), since the propensity to consume is less when
saved money has to be used, subjects were expected to buy following an
income increase but to defer buying following an income decrease.
In contrast to the behavioral life-cycle theory, the renewable resources
model (Linville & Fischer, 1991) and the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling &
Romanus, 1997) make dierent predictions depending on whether the buying
event is positive or negative. In order to make possible to test these predic-
tions, the buying event was positive (buying a new model at a discount rate)
for one group of subjects and negative (replacing a broken product) for an-
other group. For a negative buying event, both the renewable resources model
and the loss-sensitivity principle predict buying to follow an income increase
and defer buying to follow an income decrease. For a positive buying event,
the renewable resources model makes the reverse prediction whereas the loss-
sensitivity principle does not predict an eect of income change.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Subjects
Thirty two undergraduates at Goteborg University were paid $7 for par-
ticipating in the study. The subjects’ mean age was 29.7 years within a range
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of 19–46 years. An equal number of men and women were randomly assigned
to two dierent groups with 16 subjects in each.
2.1.2. Materials
Subjects were presented with 16 fictitious choices to buy a CD player, a
bookcase, an answering machine and a writing table. Buying event was
varied as a between-subjects factor. Half of the subjects were presented with
positive buying events and the other half with negative. Furthermore,
product price was varied such that in half of the choices the CD player was
more expensive than the bookcase and the answering machine more expen-
sive than the writing table and in the other half, the prices of these product
pairs were reversed. Half of the subjects were given the two parts in one
order, the other half in the reversed order.
Changes in income varied within subjects. In one within-subject condition,
subjects were asked to imagine that they had received a temporary income
increase which was the equivalent of $205, $273, $342 or $410. 1 No saved
money was available. In another within-subject condition, subjects were
asked to imagine that they had received an income decrease of $205, $273,
$342 or $410 and that they had $410, $546, $684 or $820, respectively, saved
in a bank account. In this way, total assets were equal in the income increase
and decrease conditions. Prices of the products were always $137 less than
the amount of the income change. The information was displayed and re-
sponded to on a computer.
2.1.3. Procedure
Subjects served in groups of four or less. All subjects first read the same
general instructions on the computer screen. Subjects were told that they
would be presented with fictitious situations and were asked to imagine and
respond to them as if they were real. Subjects were given a practice example
before starting.
In the group with positive buying events, subjects were asked to imagine
that they owned a product (e.g., a CD player) but that they for a long time
had been thinking about buying a new and better model. They were also told
in this condition that the product was on sale at 33% o normal price.
Subjects in the group with negative buying events were told that the product
1 These amounts were in Swedish Crowns expressed in even hundreds ($1 is approximately equal to
SEK 8).
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was broken and that they therefore were thinking about buying a new one.
(See Appendix A for the complete wording of the positive and negative
buying events). In both buying events, subjects were told that they had found
a product that they liked, but that before buying it they first wanted to check
the monthly salary they had received on the same day. Subjects were then
told about the temporary income increase or decrease and how much they
had saved in a bank account.
For each situation, subjects were asked to make a choice between buying
the product at once or waiting until later and to rate how decisive they felt of
choosing the way they did. Ratings were made on a continuous scale from 0
to 100, where 0 was defined as not especially decisive, 50 as rather decisive
and 100 very decisive.
The sessions lasted for about 15 minutes after which subjects were de-
briefed and paid.
2.2. Results and discussion
The ratings of decisiveness were given a positive sign if subjects chose to
buy and a negative sign if subjects chose to defer buying. Thus, the dependent
variable ranged from ÿ100 to 100 2 with a positive value indicating a pref-
erence to buy and a negative value a preference to defer buying.
As the means given in Table 1 show, the decisiveness to buy was greater
when subjects received an income increase than when they received an in-
come decrease. Confirming this, a 2 (buying event: positive vs. negative) by 2
(order) by 2 (income change: income increase vs. income decrease) analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor revealed a main
eect of income change, F 1; 28  31:43; p < 0:001. This result is in line
with the behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992) which
assumes that the propensity to consume is greater if money from the current-
income account can be used than if the current-assets account must be used.
No significant eects involved the buying event. Furthermore, the patterns
of results were inconsistent with both the renewable resources model (Linville
& Fischer, 1991) and the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling & Romanus,
1997). The negative results may however not be accounted for by a failure to
manipulate the buying event, since when subjects received an income increase
2 All analysis reported below were also performed on choice proportions with almost identical results.
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the ratings of decisiveness to buy were much larger for the positive buying
event than for the negative.
3. Experiment 2
Although the results of Experiment 1 were consistent with the predictions
from the behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992), the
possibility remains that it was the income change in itself, rather than the
reluctance to use saved money, which made subjects willing or unwilling to
buy. In Experiment 2, four hypothetical situations were introduced: an in-
come increase with no savings, a smaller income increase with savings, an
ordinary income with savings and an income decrease with savings. The two
intermediate conditions of income change make possible to determine if it
was the use of savings (and thus transferring money from a dierent mental
account), the change in income, or a joint eect of the use of savings and
change in income, that accounted for the dierences in decisiveness to buy,
observed in Experiment 1.
Hence, the aim of Experiment 2 was to distinguish between dierent ways
in which mental accounting may impose constraints on buying decisions (see
Fig. 1). The specifications presented below do not exhaust all possibilities but
represent the three cases which make maximally dierent predictions con-
cerning how willingness to buy varies with income change:
(1) Reluctance to use savings. If the decisiveness to buy is less when subjects
have to use saved money, then it is expected that there will only be a dif-
ference between receiving an income increase covering the expenses of a
purchase and the other conditions where subjects have to use at least some
saved money.
(2) Eect of income change. People’s decisiveness to buy may be directly
aected by an income increase or an income decrease. An income increase
Table 1
Mean ratings of decisiveness to buy for dierent buying events and income-change conditions
Buying event Income-change condition
Income decrease Income increase
Negative ÿ25.6 20.6
Positive ÿ27.3 41.2
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may thus be a dominant reason to buy and an income decrease a dominant
reason not to buy. Accordingly, the decisiveness to buy for no income change
would lie in between
(3) Ordinary income sucient. A third possible outcome is that something
wanted is purchased as long as the ordinary income is perceived as sucient.
It is possible that subjects perceive part of their ordinary income as discre-
tionary income (Katona, 1975), that is, as a part of the income that is pos-
sible to choose to spend or save. In the case of an income decrease, it is likely
that no such discretionary income is perceived. If subjects plan to buy
something wanted, it may be expected that the decisiveness to buy is greater if
a discretionary income is perceived to be available.
These three possible outcomes can be seen as dierent reasons for viola-
tions of the principle of fungibility (Thaler, 1990). The eect of an income
change is, in contrast to the other predictions, not necessarily an indication of
the use of mental accounts. However, both reluctance to use savings and
ordinary income sucient are based on the assumption that the decisiveness
to buy is dierent for dierent mental accounts (Shefrin & Thaler,
1988, 1992). For reluctance to use savings, the prediction is that the deci-
siveness to buy is less if subjects have to use savings as well as discretionary
income, while for ordinary income sucient the prediction is that the
Fig. 1. Dierent possible outcomes for the decisiveness to buy in dierent income-change conditions.
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decisiveness to buy is less if subjects have to use savings but not a discre-
tionary income.
Another aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate if an income change and
the use of saved money have the same eect on the decisiveness to buy
nondurable goods, such as a short vacation trip or buying dinner for friends,
as they have on the decisiveness to buy durable goods. Hirst et al. (1994)
found that people are more likely to borrow money (i.e., use a future income)
for something with long durability than for something with short durability.
In line with this, it may be expected that the use of savings is more preferred
for buying durable than for buying nondurable goods.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Subjects
Another 32 undergraduates (16 men and 16 women) at Goteborg Univer-
sity participated as subjects and were randomly assigned to two equally large
groups. The subjects’ mean age was 24.7 years within a range of 18–42 years.
Subjects received the equivalent of $7 in payment for their participation.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Only the positive buying event was used in Experiment 2 (see Appen-
dix A). There were 16 dierent choices in which product, price, change in
income and amount of saved money were varied. Types of goods varied
between subjects. Half of the subjects were presented with durable goods and
the other half with nondurable goods. In the durable-goods condition, the
products were a CD-player, a bookcase, an answering machine and a writing
table. The nondurable-good conditions consisted of choices of a vacation trip
for four days, arranging a party, a vacation trip for two days and buying
dinner for friends.
All subjects were presented with the four dierent income change situa-
tions: income increase with no savings, smaller income increase with savings,
ordinary income with savings and income decrease with savings. These sit-
uations were constructed so that the total assets were equal. Two price levels
for the durable or nondurable goods were used: the price was $273 when
income change plus savings totalled $410 and it was $137 when income
change plus savings totalled $273 (see Table 2).
In all other respects, the materials and procedures were the same as in
Experiment 1. The task took about 15 min to complete. After completing it,
subjects were debriefed and paid for their participation.
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3.2. Results and discussion
The ratings of decisiveness to buy were given a positive sign if subjects
chose to buy, otherwise they were given a negative sign. The means are
displayed in Fig. 2 for the dierent income-change conditions. Of the three
expected outcomes depicted in Fig. 1, the pattern of results is most similar to
that of ‘ordinary income sucient’. A 2 (good: durable vs. nondurable) by 4
(income change: income increase/no savings vs. income increase/savings vs.
ordinary income vs. income decrease) ANOVA with repeated measures on
Fig. 2. Mean ratings of decisiveness to buy in dierent income-change conditions.
Table 2
Amounts of income change and savings for the dierent income-change conditions a
Income-change conditions
Income increase Income increase Ordinary income Income decrease
No savings Savings Savings Savings
$273 ($0) $68 ($205) $0 ($273) ÿ$273 ($546)
$410 ($0) $137 ($273) $0 ($410) ÿ$410 ($820)
a Amount of savings in parentheses.
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the last factor was performed on the ratings. A highly significant and strong
main eect was found of income change, F(2.39, 71.81) 9.58 (Greenhouse–
Geisser correction of the degrees of freedom), p < 0.001. Bonferroni-cor-
rected separate t tests at p 0.05 revealed that only the means for the income-
decrease condition diered reliably from the other means. The results thus
replicated those of Experiment 1 in showing a reliable dierence between
income increase and decrease. However, since subjects were equally willing to
buy when they had an ordinary income, the results suggested that it is not the
income change in itself that aect decisiveness to buy. Thus, more decisive
support was obtained for the behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler,
1988, 1992).
Although not statistically significant, the eect of income change tended to
dier for durable vs. nondurable goods (see Fig. 3). For nondurable goods,
the results were most similar to the ‘ordinary income sucient’ outcome.
However, for the durable goods, the pattern of results was not consistent
with any of the stated outcomes. A possible interpretation is that the deci-
siveness to buy durable goods depends on the income of the specific month,
increasing with the increase in income and decreasing with the decrease in
income. However, the results also suggested that subjects overall tended to be
more decisive to buy the nondurable goods. Another possibility is therefore
Fig. 3. Mean ratings of decisiveness to buy for dierent income-change conditions and types of goods.
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that dierences in attractiveness rather than type of goods account for the
dierences between nondurable and durable goods.
4. General discussion
The results of both experiments supported the behavioral life-cycle theory
(Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992). In Experiment 1, neither the pattern of results
predicted from the renewable resources model (Linville & Fischer, 1991) nor
from the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling & Romanus, 1997) was observed.
Contrary to what was predicted, decisiveness to buy increased for an income
increase when the buying event was positive. For an income decrease, the
decisiveness to buy was always low. The question arises why these explana-
tions do not seem to be valid in the present study, although they accurately
predicted previous results (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Linville & Fischer,
1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Romanus et al., 1996, 1997). In the present
study the choices concerned immediate or deferred buying. A possibility is
that achieving self-control, entailed by the use of mental accounts, is more
important in such choices than the aective control of events occurring on
the same or dierent days as investigated by Linville and Fischer (1991). For
the same reason the loss-sensitivity principle may not apply: That an income
change would not be considered when facing a positive buying event appears
to be opposed to the goal of self-control.
In all income-change conditions, subjects knew that they had access to the
same amount of money. In accordance with the concept of a mental account,
the changes in decisiveness to buy thus reflected unwillingness to use saved
money. However, in Experiment 1 it was not possible to rule out the possi-
bility that income change itself aected the buying decisions. This possibility
was ruled out by the results of Experiment 2.
In Experiment 2, two possible specifications of how buying may be con-
strained through the use of mental accounts were contrasted to the possibility
of an eect of the income change in itself which not necessarily implies the use
of mental accounts. In one specification, subjects never used any saved
money; in the other, a dierence was introduced between saved money and
discretionary income (a part of the income which may be spent or saved). The
results showed that subjects were not reluctant to use discretionary income
for consumption. Hence, the results clearly validated the use of mental ac-
counts in specific buying decisions. This make the use of mental accounts
more apparent as a strategy of self-control.
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Although it violates normative theory and the principle of fungibility of
money (Thaler, 1990) people may have their reasons for using mental ac-
counts, applying them as a general self-control device. An important question
is to what extent the present results from fictitious buying situations are
possible to extend to real-life situations. On one hand, subjects may be ex-
pected to be more rational when responding to fictitious situations. On the
other hand, in real-life situations, factors like temptation and impulsiveness
may decrease the eectiveness of mental accounts as a self-control device.
Hence, the incentives to use mental accounts may be greater in real life but
may at the same time be harder to apply. It is reasonable to believe that the
pronounced use of mental accounts in the present experiments also to some
degree extend to real-life situations.
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Appendix A. Positive and negative buying event
Positive buying event: Imagine that you have a CD player but that you
have been thinking about buying a new and better one for a long time.
Today, after looking in dierent stores, you found a CD player that you
think is great. Normally the price of the CD player is SEK 3000 but right
now it costs SEK 2000 which is a 33% discount. Before you decide to buy it
you want to check your monthly salary that you have received today.
Imagine that you have received a temporary income increase (decrease) of
3000 SEK after taxes. You have SEK 0 (6000) saved in a bank account.
Would you buy the new CD player now or wait until later?
Negative buying event: Imagine that your CD player is broken and that you
therefore are thinking about buying a new one. Today, after looking in
dierent stores, you found a CD player that you think is a good replacement.
The price of the CD player is SEK 2000. Before you decide to buy you want
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to check your monthly salary that you have received today. Imagine that you
have received a temporary income increase (decrease) of SEK 3000 after
taxes. You have SEK 0 (6000) saved in a bank account. Would you buy the
new CD player now or wait until later?
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